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Abstract 
This study examines the effectiveness of redistribution policies considering balance of payments. Unlike 
Bowles (2012) and Abe (2015, 2016), we assume that capital movement is sluggish to consider the 
short-run effects. Results indicate that conventional egalitarian policies such as increasing 
unemployment compensation and strengthening dismissal regulations can be effective, whereas an 
asset-based redistribution such as a decrease in the ratio of monitoring labor cannot be. These results 
contradict Bowles (2012). We need to reevaluate conventional egalitarian policies if the effects of 
effective demand and adjustment of capital continue in the long run. 
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1. Introduction 
Worries persist that globalization may expand inequality and make it difficult to redistribute, thereby 
decreasing international competitiveness and encouraging capital flight. Results from Bowles’ (2012) 
sharking model featuring free cross-border movement of capital endorse asset-based redistribution over 
traditional pro-worker policies because the former improves labor productivity whereas the latter 
induces capital flight. Bowles (2012) disregards the issue of effective demand to focus on supply, but 
Stock hammer (2015) argues that deterioration in effective demand instigates stagnation in the global 
economy. Abe (2015) introduces effective demand into Bowles’ (2012) basic model and shows that 
asset-based redistribution under globalization is not always effective, given the effective demand 
constraints. Like Bowles (2012), Abe (2016) extends his 2015 model to consider budget constraints but 
disregards influences on effective demand. Abe (2016) shows that asset-based redistribution policy is 
not always effective, whereas income-based redistribution is effective under demand and budget 
constraints. 
These studies apparently adopt the extreme assumption that capital moves swiftly across borders to 
illustrate globalization. That assumption is unrealistic in the short run because capital confronts many 
barriers. Therefore, we introduce balance of payments into our model to consider sluggish capital 
movements and to discuss the effectiveness of egalitarian policies. 
We assume an economy in which goods produced using labor and capital are either for consumption or 
investment. Labor is homogeneous and immobile across borders. Employers extract labor by 
monitoring workers and giving threats of dismissal. Capital moves globally to pursue domestic and 
foreign rates of profit. Workers receive and spend all wages and unemployment compensation. Capital 
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consumes a fraction of the profit. Employment falls (rises) with excess (deficient) supply in the goods 
market. 
This study proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains our basic model. Section 3 introduces governmental 
budget constraints to our basic model. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Basic Model 
Gross output Q is 
Q=yeh(1-m)                             (1) 
where h, e, y and m denote the total hours of work supplied in the economy, labor effort per hour, 
production per unit of effort, and the fraction of total work time accounted for by monitors, respectively. 
We normalize h to 0<h<1 and assume that workers can choose effort unit to be 0 or 1. 
Firms monitor workers and determine wage rates to equate payoffs between employees who work and 
those who shark. Thus,  
w–a=(1-τ)w+τhw+τ(1-h)b                       (2) 
where w, a, τ and b denote the wage rate, disutility of labor, probability of firing, and unemployment 
compensation, respectively. The left (right) side shows the payoff for employees who work (shark). 
The first term on the right side represents the case of continued employment; the second, the case 
where the dismissed employees find new jobs; and the third, the case where the employees are 
dismissed and remain unemployed. 
From Eq. (2),  
W= b
a

h)-τ(1
                          (3) 
In Eq. (3), w is the minimum wage rate that prevents sharking. Profits and workers’ utility are optimal 
at that wage. Wage rate w is an increasing function of disutility of labor (a), the employment rate (h), 
and unemployment compensation (b). Eq. (3) is the equilibrium condition for labor supply.  
The rate of profit is 
r=
k
m
w
ky


1                             (4) 
where k denotes capital per labor hour. k as an intermediate good is absent from the numerator in Eq. 
(4) because the goods produced have the characteristics of both investment and consumption. Workers 
identified for monitoring receive wages. 
The after-tax rate of profit (π) is 
π=r(1-t)=
k
m
w
kyt )
1
(1

 ）（
                        (5) 
where t is the tax rate for profit. 
The expectation of after-tax rate of profit E(π) is 
E(π)=π(1-d)                             (6) 
where d is the probability of confiscation, which depends on countries’ macroeconomic policies and 
political factors. 
Next, we address the goods market, for which the equilibrium is defined as 
(y-k)(1-m)h=i+c+g+x                         (7) 
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In Eq. (7), i, c, g and x denote investment, consumption, governmental spending, and net exports, 
respectively. 
We assume that investment depends on after-tax profit as in Bowles and Boyer (1988). The investment 
function is 
i=݅଴+݅௥rk(1-m)(1-t)(1-d)h, ݅଴>0, ݅௥>0                 (8) 
where ݅଴, ݅௥, and k(1-m)h are animal spirits, responsiveness of investment to profit, and the amount of 
capital, respectively. 
Income from all wages and some profit is spent, rendering the consumption function as 
c=[w+(1-sr)r(1-t)k(1-m)]h                        (9) 
The balance of payments is 
x+z(E(π) − ρ)=0                          (10) 
where	ρ	and	z are respectively, the in terest rate on safe assets in the foreign sector and the capital 
account, which is an increasing function of E(π) − ρ.	 When E(π) − ρ increases, x decreases because 
the domestic currency appreciates. 
Assume employment rises (falls) from excess (deficient) demand for goods. The dynamic equation for 
unemployment compensation is (Note 2) 
ℎ̇ = ߙ[(y − k)(1 −m)h − (i + c + g + x)]              (11) 
Results from analyzing comparative statics appear in Table 1 (Note 3). 
 
Table 1. Analysis of Comparative Statics 
 h w r 
m + + - 
t ∓ ∓ ∓ 
b + + - 
τ - - + 
a + + - 
k + + - 
ρ + + - 
d ∓ ∓ ∓ 
ݏ௥  - - + 
݅଴ + + - 
݅௥ + + - 
 
An increase in m creates excess demand for goods through decrease in production; therefore, h 
increases. Thereafter, w increases because of sharking and r decreases. 
An increase in t leads to a decrease in international demand in the goods market because of the 
decrease in the rate of after-tax profit. However, it stimulates exports because the decrease in the rate of 
profit leads to a decline in the exchange rate. Therefore, the effect on employment is ambiguous. 
Increases in b, a, ρ, ݅଴		, and ݅௥ and decreases in τ and ݏ௥  create excess demand in the goods market 
through wage increases; therefore, h increases. Thereafter, w increases because of sharking and r 
decreases. 
An increase in k creates excess demand for goods through increase in the intermediate inputs and 
decline in the exchange rate due to a decrease in the rate of profit. 
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An increase in d decreases domestic demand because of the decrease in the expectations of the rate of 
after-tax profit. However, it leads to a decline in exports through devaluation of the domestic currency. 
Therefore, the effect on employment is ambiguous. 
 
3. Governmental Budget Constraints 
Government spending on labor productivity (p) includes support for nutrition, medicine, education, and 
infrastructure. We assume its effectiveness to be λ, giving  
y=y(λp)                                  (12) 
Next, we address governmental budget constraints. Tax revenues received only from profits are 
th{(1-m)[y(λp)-k]-w}. Government expends funds on unemployment compensation (b(1-h)) and p. 
Thus,  
g=b(1-h)+p=th{(1-m)[y(λp)-k]-w}                   (13) 
Substituting (3) and (12) for (13) delivers  
b(1-h)+p=th{(1-m)[y(λp)-k]-
h)-τ(1
a
-b}                (14) 
Substituting (3)–(6), (8)–(10) and (12)–(14) for (7),  
[sr-ir(1-d)](1-t){(y(λp)-k)(1-m)-[
h)-τ(1
a
+b]}h= oi -z{(1-t)(1-d) 

k
b
a
]
h)-τ(1
[
m-1
1
-k-y(λ(λ
ρ} 
(15) 
We could sum the model using Eqs. (14) and (15) and the two endogenous variables h and p (Note 4). 
Results from analyzing comparative statics appear in Table 2 (Note 5). 
 
Table 2. Analysis of Comparative Statics 
 h w y p 
m ∓ ∓ ∓ ∓ 
t ∓ ∓ ∓ ∓ 
b ∓ ∓ ∓ ∓ 
τ ∓ ∓ ∓ ∓ 
a ∓ ∓ ∓ ∓ 
k ∓ ∓ ∓ ∓ 
ρ + + ∓ ∓ 
d ∓ ∓ ∓ ∓ 
ݏ௥  - - ∓ ∓ 
݅௥ + + ∓ ∓ 
݅଴௥ + + ∓ ∓ 
 
Several notable results are evident. 
When m increases, employment (h) rises directly through excess demand for goods. However, the 
indirect effect on the goods market through p is unclear because the direction of p is not deterministic. 
If the effectiveness of y’ is sufficiently large, p can increase. Therefore, the effect on h is ambiguous.  
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When t increases, employment (h) rises through excess demand for goods via income distribution and 
higher exports attributable to currency depreciation. In addition, tax revenues increase. Whether p 
increases is not deterministic. If y’ is sufficiently effective, p and h can increase. In short, the total 
effect on h is ambiguous. Furthermore, cases wherein a and b decrease give the same results as in case 
of an increase in t. 
An increase in τ decreases h directly because the wage rate and exports decrease. However, the indirect 
effect on the goods market through p is unclear because the direction of p is not deterministic. If the 
effectiveness of y’ is sufficiently small, p can decrease; thereafter, h increases. The total effect of τ on h 
is ambiguous. 
An increase in k increases h directly because excess supply in the goods market due to decrease in net 
production and increase in exports. However, the indirect effect on the goods market through p is 
unclear because the direction of p is not deterministic. If the effectiveness of y’ is sufficiently small, p 
can increase; thereafter, h decreases. The effect of k on h is ambiguous. 
An increase in ρ directly increases h because exports rise as the domestic currency depreciates, then w 
increases and r decreases. The direction of p is not deterministic and depends on the effectiveness of y’. 
Whether an increase in d increases h is unclear because it reduces investment but stimulates exports via 
depreciation in the domestic currency. The direction of p is not deterministic and depends on the 
effectiveness of y’. 
An increase in the saving rate on profit income (Sr) decreases employment (h) through an excess supply 
in the goods market. The direction of p is not deterministic. Dec in ݅௥ and ݅଴equal the increase in ݏ௥ . 
 
4. Conclusion 
The author examined the effectiveness of redistribution policies considering balance of payments. 
Unlike Bowles (2012) and Abe (2015, 2016), we assumed sluggish international movements of capital 
to consider short-run effects. 
We first showed that enlarging unemployment compensation and strengthening dismissal regulations 
are effective conventional policies but asset-based redistributions such as the decrease in the ratio of 
monitoring labor are not. These results conflict with Bowles (2012). We also confirmed the 
effectiveness of income redistribution. 
We introduced budget constraints on government spending for labor productivity and found that the 
effectiveness of egalitarian policies depends on the effectiveness of government spending. 
These results support the effectiveness of conventional egalitarian policies and consideration of an 
asset-based redistribution in the short run. However, if the effects on demand and adjustment of capital 
persist in the long run, policymakers must reevaluate conventional egalitarian policies. 
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Notes 
Note 1. This study is part of a research scholarship undertaken by the Department of Economics, 
Nagoya Gakuin University, in 2016. Any errors are mine alone. 
Note 2. See Appendix 1 for the stability condition. 
Note 3. See Appendix 2 for calculations. 
Note 4. See Appendix 3 for a stability condition. 
Note 5. See Appendix 4 for calculations. 
 
Appendix 1 
Substituting (3)–(6) and (8)–(10) for (11), we get 
 ܾ̇ = ߙ ൝{[ݏ௥ − ݅௥(1 − ݀)](1 − ݐ) + ݐ} ቄ(ݕ − ݇)(1 −݉) − ቂ
௔
ఛ(ଵି௛)
+ ܾቃቅ ℎ − ݅଴ + ݃ − ݖ ቊ(1 − ݐ)(1 −
݀)
௬ି௞ି
భ
భష೘
ቂ
ೌ
ഓ(భష೓)
ା௕ቃ
௞
− ߩൠൡ																									           (16) 
Thus, a stable condition is 
ܦ = {[ݏ௥ − ݅௥(1 − ݀)](1 − ݐ) + ݐ} ቄ(ݕ − ݇)(1 −݉) − [
௔
ఛ(ଵି௛)
+ ܾ]ቅ − ({[ݏ௥ − ݅௥(1 − ݀)](1 − ݐ) +
ݐ}ℎ+z’(1-t)(1-d)(-
ଵ
௞(ଵି௠)
))
௔
ఛ
ଵ
(ଵି௛)మ
> 0                   (17) 
 
Appendix 2 
From (20): 
ௗ௛
ௗ௠
=
{[௦ೝି௜ೝ(ଵିௗ)](ଵି௧)ା௧}(௬ି௞)ା௭
′
(భష೟)(భష೏)
ೖ [
ೌ
ഓ(భష೓)
ା௕]
భ
(భష೘)మ
஽
> 0									        (18) 
݀ℎ
݀ݐ
=
[ݏ௥ − ݅௥(1 − ݀) − 1] ൜(ݕ − ݇)(1 −݉) − ൤
ܽ
߬(1 − ℎ) + ܾ
൨ൠℎ + ݖ′(1 − ݀)
ݕ − ݇ −
1
1 −݉ ൤
ܽ
߬(1 − ℎ) + ܾ
൨
݇
ܦ
				 
                                                                        (19) 
ௗ௛
ௗ௕
=
{[௦ೝି௜ೝ(ଵିௗ)](ଵି௧)ା௧}ା௭′
(భష೟)(భష೏)
ೖ(భష೘)
஽
																																				                   (20) 
If Keynesian stability holds, 
ௗ௛
ௗ௕
> 0 because of {[ݏ௥ − ݅௥(1 − d)](1 − t) + t}> 0. 
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ௗ௛
ௗ௞
=
{[௦ೝି௜ೝ(ଵିௗ)](ଵି௧)ା௧}௛ା௭
′(ଵି௧)(ଵିௗ){௬ି
భ
భష೘
[
ೌ
ഓ(భష೓)
ା௕]}
భ
ೖమ
஽
> 0                (21) 
ௗ௛
ௗఘ
=
௭′
஽
> 0											                        (22) 
ௗ௛
ௗௗ
=
ିቄ(௬ି௞)(ଵି௠)ିቂ
ೌ
ഓ(భష೓)
ା௕ቃቅ௜ೝ(ଵି௧)௛ା௭′(ଵି௧)
೤షೖష భభష೘[
ೌ
ഓ(భష೓)
శ್]
ೖ
஽
				             (23) 
ௗ௛
ௗ௦ೝ
= −
(ଵି௧)ቄ(௬ି௞)(ଵି௠)ିቂ
ೌ
ഓ(భష೓)
ା௕ቃቅ௛
஽
< 0				                (24) 
ௗ௛
ௗ௔
=
{[௦ೝି௜ೝ(ଵିௗ)](ଵି௧)ା௧}
೓
ഓ(భష೓)
஽
> 0	                     (25) 
 
Appendix 3 
From (14), we get 
ௗ௣
ௗ௛
=
(ଵି௧)௕ା௧{(ଵି௠)[௬(ఒ௣)ି௞]ି
ೌ
ഓ(భష೓)మ
}
ଵି௧௛(ଵି௠)௬′λ
≶ 0	                (26) 
From (11), (15), and (26), a stable condition is 
A={[ݏ௥ − ݅௥(1 − d)](1 − t)} ቄ(y − k)(1 −m) − ቂ
௔
ఛ(ଵି௛)
+ bቃቅ − ቄ[ݏ௥ − ݅௥(1 − d)](1 − t)h −
z′(1 − t)(1 − d)
ଵ
௞(ଵି௠)
ቅ
௔
ఛ(ଵି௛)మ
+ ൤{[ݏ௥ − ݅௥(1 − ݀)](1 − ݐ)}ℎ + ݖ
′
(భష೟)(భష೏)
ೖ ൨ ݕ ′λ
ௗ௣
ௗ௛
> 0        (27) 
 
Appendix 4 
Calculation of m 
From (14) and (15): 
ௗ௛
ௗ௠
=
[௦ೝି௜ೝ(ଵିௗ)](ଵି௧)௛ቀ௬ି௞ି௬′ఒ
೏೛
೏೘
ቁା௭మ
(భష೟)(భష೏)
ೖ
{ቂ
ೌ
ഓ(భష೓)
ା௕ቃ
భ
(భష೘)మ
ା௬′ఒ
೏೛
೏೘
}
஺
		              (28) 
ௗ௣
ௗ௠
=
ି௧௛(௬ି௞)
ଵି௧௛(ଵି௠)௬′ఒ
		                         (29) 
If the effect of y’ is minor, 
ௗ௣
ௗ௠
< 0. 
Calculation of t 
From (14) and (15): 
݀ℎ
݀ݐ
=
[ݏ௥ − ݅௥(1 − ݀)] ൜(ݕ − ݇)(1 −݉) − ൤
ܽ
߬(1 − ℎ) + ܾ
൨ൠℎ + ݖ′(1 − ݀)
ݕ − ݇ −
1
1 − ݉൤
ܽ
߬(1 − ℎ) + ܾ
൨
݇
ܣ
 
−
[௦ೝି௜ೝ(ଵିௗ)](ଵି௧)(ଵି௠)௬
′ఒା௭′(ଵି௧)(ଵିௗ)
೤′ഊ
ೖ
஺
ௗ௣
ௗ௧
								             (30) 
ௗ௣
ௗ௧
=
ቄ(௬ି௞)(ଵି௠)ିቂ
ೌ
ഓ(భష೓)
ା௕ቃቅ௛
ଵି௧௛(ଵି௠)௬′ఒ
								                (31) 
If the effect of y’ is sufficiently large, 
ௗ௣
ௗ௧
< 0,
ௗ௛
ௗ௧
> 0. Thus, 
ௗ௪
ௗ௧
> 0 and 
ௗ௥
ௗ௧
< 0 hold. 
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Calculation of τ 
From (14) and (15): 
݀ℎ
݀߬
=
−[ݏ௥ − ݅௥(1 − ݀)](1 − ݐ)ℎ
ܽ
(1 − ℎ)߬ଶ − ݖ
′ (1 − ݐ)(1 − ݀)ܽ
݇(1 − ݉)(1 − ℎ)߬ଶ
ܣ
 
−
[௦ೝି௜ೝ(ଵିௗ)](ଵି௧)௛௬
′ఒା௭′(ଵି௧)(ଵିௗ)
೤′ഊ
ೖ
஺
ௗ௣
ௗఛ
                        (32) 
ௗ௣
ௗ௧
=
೟೓ೌ
(భష೓)ഓమ
ଵି௧௛(ଵି௠)௬′ఒ
                         (33) 
If the effect of y’ is minor, 
ௗ௣
ௗఛ
> 0,
ௗ௛
ௗఛ
< 0. Thus, 
ௗ௪
ௗఛ
< 0 and 
ௗ௥
ௗఛ
> 0 hold. 
Calculation of a 
From (14) and (15): 
݀ℎ
݀ܽ
=
[ݏ௥ − ݅௥(1 − ݀)]
(1 − ݐ)ℎ
(1 − ℎ)߬ + ݖ
′ (1 − ݐ)(1 − ݀)
݇(1 −݉)(1 − ℎ)߬
ܣ
 
−
[௦ೝି௜ೝ(ଵିௗ)](ଵି௧)௛௬
′ఒା௭′(ଵି௧)(ଵିௗ)
೤′ഊ
ೖ
஺
ௗ௣
ௗ௔
                  (34) 
ௗ௣
ௗ௔
= −
೟೓
(భష೓)ഓ
ଵି௧௛(ଵି௠)௬′ఒ
                           (35) 
If the effect of y’ is minor, 
ௗ௣
ௗ௔
< 0,
ௗ௛
ௗ௔
> 0. Thus, 
ௗ௪
ௗ௔
> 0 and 
ௗ௥
ௗ௔
< 0 hold. 
Calculation of k 
From (14) and (15): 
݀ℎ
݀݇
=
[ݏ௥ − ݅௥(1 − ݀)](1 − ݐ)ℎ + ݖ
′ (1 − ݐ)(1 − ݀)
݇ଶ {ݕ −
1
1 −݉ ൤
ܽ
߬(1 − ℎ) + ܾ
൨}
ܣ
 
−
[௦ೝି௜ೝ(ଵିௗ)](ଵି௧)௛௬
′ఒା௭′(ଵି௧)(ଵିௗ)
೤′ഊ
ೖ
஺
ௗ௣
ௗ௞
		                      (36) 
ௗ௣
ௗ௞
= −
௧௛(ଵି௠)
ଵି௧௛(ଵି௠)௬′ఒ
	                           (37) 
If the effect of y’ is minor, 
ௗ௣
ௗ௞
< 0,
ௗ௛
ௗ௞
> 0. Thus, 
ௗ௪
ௗ௞
> 0 and 
ௗ௥
ௗ௞
< 0 hold. 
Calculation of ρ 
From (14) and (15): 
ௗ௛
ௗఘ
=
௭′
஺
> 0                         (38) 
ௗ௪
ௗఘ
> 0
ௗ௥
ௗఘ
< 0. 
Calculation of d 
From (14) and (15): 
ௗ௛
ௗௗ
=
ିቄ(௬ି௞)(ଵି௠)ିቂ
ೌ
ഓ(భష೓)
ା௕ቃቅ௛(ଵି௧)௜ೝା௭
′(ଵି௧)
೤షೖష భభష೘൤
ೌ
ഓ(భష೓)
శ್൨
ೖ
஺
        (39) 
Calculation of ࢙࢘ 
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From (14) and (15): 
ௗ௛
ௗ௦ೝ
= −
(ଵି௧)
஺
ቄ(ݕ − ݇)(1 −݉) − ቂ
௔
ఛ(ଵି௛)
+ ܾቃቅ ℎ < 0	            (40) 
ௗ௪
ௗ௦ೝ
< 0
ௗ௥
ௗ௦ೝ
> 0. 
Calculation of b 
From (14) and (15): 
݀ℎ
ܾ݀
=
[ݏ௥ − ݅௥(1 − ݀)](1 − ݐ)ℎ + ݖ
′(1 − ݀)
1
݇(1 −݉)
ܣ
 
−
[௦ೝି௜ೝ(ଵିௗ)](ଵି௧)௛௬
′ఒା௭′(ଵି௧)(ଵିௗ)
೤′ഊ
ೖ
஺
ௗ௣
ௗ௕
		                  (41) 
ௗ௣
ௗ௕
= −
ଵି௕ା௧௛
ଵି௧௛(ଵି௠)௬′ఒ
		                      (42) 
If the effect of y’ is minor, 
ௗ௣
ௗ௕
< 0݉,			
ௗ௛
ௗ௕
> 0. Thus, 
ௗ௪
ௗ௕
> 0 and 
ௗ௥
ௗ௕
< 0 hold. 
 
